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INTRODUCTION
The computer industry is a very sophisticated field with highly
technical and complicated machinery. Every computer is made up of
thousands of smaller component parts. These parts change constantly
because the computer industry is in a constant state of innovation.
All technological advancements affect the industry. Innovations
that prove to be beneficial are either copied or similar versions are
developped by competing firms. There is, however, at least some lag
time between the developing firm's introduction of the innovation and
the competing firms' development of their own version or copy. There
is some fear that during this lag time the firm with the innovation will
enjoy a significant amount of market power. The fear is that these
firms will use this market power to violate the antitrust laws through
illegal tie-in arrangements. These tie-in arrangements require purchasers of the innovation (the tying product) to also purchase something
that they either do not want to buy or could buy elsewhere (the tied
product).
An industry like the computer industry that is subject to constant
innovation finds perhaps its greatest source of competition in those innovations. Each firm tries to keep one step ahead of the other firms.
Any firm that constantly lags behind the others has a far smaller
chance of being a successful competitor and faces the consequences of
being an unsuccesful competitor. There are two generally recognized
reasons why competition is encouraged. First, consumers benefit from
this competition because cheaper and better products are constantly being produced. Second, the general philosophy of the antitrust law is
that perfect competition is a desired goal. However, these factors must
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be weighed against the potential anticompetitive effects that can result
in the computer industry from innovations creating significant market
power. These anticompetitive effects result from the lag time or the
time required by the industry to catch up with the innovations of its
competitors. During this time the innovator computer company will
possess some market power because it has a monopoly on a product that
consumers want to purchase.
Ensuring that the company does not abuse this market power is the
role of antitrust law. The antitrust law should encourage innovation
and the necessary market power that results from innovation while also
ensuring that that market power is not misused.
This Note will examine one specific way in which that market
power can be abused: illegal tie-in arrangements. Specifically this Note
will deal with the single product issue in tie-in arrangements. This issue arises because no illegal tie-in can occur when a single product is
sold. The question then is what exactly constitutes a single product?
Computers are made up of thousands of individual parts and yet a large
collection of such parts are referred to as a single product that we term
the computer. If this were not the case, then whenever a company tried
to sell any two components of a computer together they would be guilty
of an illegal tie-in. When deciding exactly where to draw the line between one product and two distinct products, the desirability of encouraging innovation (which pushes towards a broader definition) and the
need to minimize the potential anticompetitive creation of market
power (which pushes towards a narrower definition) must be kept in
mind. This Note will look at the current approaches and evaluate them
in terms of the recent computer tie-in cases.
This Note will begin with a general review of tying arrangements.
A short review of the history of the single product defense will follow.
A review of the Data General1 cases along with the other relevant cases
dealing with tying arrangements in the computer industry will be next.
Finally, a standard for. the single product defense will be suggested specifically for the computer industry.
I.

BRIEF REVIEW OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS

One must first be familiar with tying arrangements in general to
understand the single product issue. A short history of tying arrangements is, therefore, in order.
A tying arrangement occurs when a person is forced to purchase or
1. In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ca. 1980),
529 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ca. 1981), rev'd sub nom, Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734
F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 18

(1985).
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lease some product (the tied product) in order to purchase or lease some
other product (the tying product) that he desires. 2 For example, if a
buyer wants to purchase a computer from IBM, but IBM will only sell
the computer to them if the buyer also agrees to purchase a typewriter,
then this would be an illegal tying arrangement. The computer would
be the tying product and the typewriter would be the tied product.
These arrangements are deemed illegal under both Section 1 of the
4
Sherman Act 3 and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
The Supreme Court held that tying arrangements were per se violations of the antitrust laws in InternationalBusiness Machines v. United
States.5 The Court has developed several elements that must be present
before an arrangement will be considered a tying arrangement. First
the plaintiff must show that two distinct products are involved. 6 Next
the plaintiff must show the presence of "forcing. ' 7 "Forcing" essentially means that the seller has enough market power to compel the
purchaser to take the tied product with the tying product. The final requirement for a per se violation of the antitrust laws is that a seller
"foreclose competitors from any substantial market" for the tied product. If all of these elements are shown then a per se violation of the
antitrust laws is present. The defendant, however, may have an opportunity to present affirmative defenses. 9 The Supreme Court has allowed several through the years. It has twice allowed the defense of
goodwill, i.e., the defense that a seller has the right in certain situations
to claim that the tie-in is necessary to protect the reputation of the company in terms of the quality of the product it produces.1 0 The Court has
also affirmed a lower court's holding that a new product defense was
valid. This defense contends that the buyers lacked the technological
expertise needed to deal with the sellers' products and that their
purchase of the products separately would deprive the new business of
2. Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Edwin Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
4. Id.
5. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
6. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
7. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 16-18. See also, Slawson, A New Concept of Competition: Reanalyzing Tie-in Doctrine after Hyde, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 257, 261-63 (1985).
8. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
9. Theoretically the per se label means that if the elements are shown then a violation of the antitrust laws has occurred, but the Court has seemingly always allowed affirmative defenses to be presented. Slawson, Are the Per Se Rules Absolute? (Apr. 7,
1987).
10. International Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 397-98; International Business Mach. Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936).
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the opportunity to develop goodwill.' 1 The Court has also allowed a
cost justification defense. This defense applies where the sale of two
products results in a substantial reduction in costs. 1 2 Finally, the Court

has allowed the single product defense 13 (which will be dealt with in detail later).
Despite these defenses, the Court has found several tying arrangements that violated antitrust laws. InternationalBusiness Machines v.
United States,14 was the Court's first per se treatment of a tie-in. Here,
the Court found that IBM illegally restrained trade by requiring those
who leased its computers to satisfy all of their computing card needs
through IBM. The Court specifically rejected a goodwill defense by
holding that anyone could make cards that met the specifications for
IBM's computers.' 5 In International Salt Co. v. United States, 16 the
Court found an illegal tie-in when International Salt required buyers of
7
its salt machines to purchase all of their salt requirements from them.'
The Court again disallowed a goodwill defense, holding that while the
manufacturer could require the use of a specific grade of salt, anybody
could supply that salt. i8 In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States,19 the railway required grantees or lessees of its lands to ship all
of the products made on those lands on the railway's railroads.2 0 The
railway argued that its requirement did not decrease competition because the agreements allowed the lessees and grantees to use other railroads if their prices were cheaper.2 ' The Court, however, rejected this
22
defense because the railway still had first choice at comparable prices.
More recently the Court found an illegal tie-in in Jefferson ParishHospital DistrictNo. 2 v. Hyde.23 In this case a hospital required that all of
its patients use specific anesthesiologists. The Court held that the tie-in
of anesthesiological services with other services offered by the hospital
was impermissible. This case was especially important because four
members of the Court agreed in a concurring opinion that the per se
rule for tying arrangements should be changed to a rule of reason
11. United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556-58 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd,
365 U.S. 567 (1961).
12. United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 52-55 (1962).
13. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1979).
14. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
15. Id, at 138-39.
16. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
17. Id. at 397-98.
18. Id.
19. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
20. Id. at 11-12.
21. Id at 12.
22. Id.
23. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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analysis.
Before getting to the single product defense, it is important to consider why businesses try to tie the sale of one product to another.
There are many reasons.
First, a firm may have monopoly power over one product by virtue of
patent protection, strong product differentiation, or scale economies;
and it may try to exploit this leverage in a second market where, without the tie, it could earn no more than a normal return.... Second and
closely related, the profits attainable from coordinated monopoly pricing of two goods which, for example, are complements in use, will generally be higher than those realized by setting a monopoly price for
each commodity separately.... Third, tying is somet.imes a convenient
way of discriminating in price according to demand ....
Fourth, the
producer of a technically complex machine may engage in tying to control the quality of materials and supplies used with its machine, so that
the reputation of its product is not sullied by breakdowns caused
through the use of faulty supplies. Fifth, certain economies may be realized by producing or distributing the tied and tying goods together. . . . Finally, tying contracts
may be employed to evade
25
governmental price controls ....

II.

BACKGROUND ON THE SINGLE PRODUCT DEFENSE

Two distinct products must be involved for an illegal tie-in to be
present. No illegal tie-in is present if only one product is involved because there would be no tying or tied product. Therefore there cannot
be any violation of the antitrust laws in such cases.
The single product defense can be viewed in two ways. One way is
to see it as an affirmative defense. The other way is to view it as a
means of showing that the tie-in rule does not apply in the first place.
The analysis in either case is similar, so this Note will not deal with the
two cases separately but will consider them together.
The Supreme Court has dealt with the single product question in
26
four cases. First, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
the Court held that advertising space in morning and evening newspapers was a single product because the spaces were sold to advertisers in
the same market. 27 Second, in United States v. Jerrold Electronics
24. A rule of reason analysis means that the court considers all possible justifications
for the alleged antitrust violation to determine if it unreasonably restrains trade. As a
practical matter, rule of reason analysis almost always results in a finding that there was
no illegal retraint of trade in violation of the antitrust laws. See also Hyde, 466 U.S. at 3436 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Slawson, supra note 7, at 261-63.
25.

F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

582-583 (1980).
26. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
27. Id at 613-14.
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Corp.,28 the Court affirmed a lower court holding that various components of an antenna system were all separate products 29 (but allowed

the tie-in based on a new firm defense.) 30 Third, in FortnerEnterprises
v. United States Steel Corp.,31 the Court held that prefabricated buildings were separate products from loans offered by the same company in
excess of the amount needed to finance the buildings. 32 Finally, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,33 the Court found that
anesthesiological services were a separate product from other services
offered by the hospital. 34 This last case is the current authority on how
to deal with the single product issue and will be dealt with more thoroughly after a review of lower court approaches to the issue.
The lower courts have taken many different approaches to the single product issue.35 Among the factors considered by the lower courts
are:
(1) Whether selling the components together results in cost
36
savings;

(2) Whether the number of each component in the combination
37
remains constant or varied;
(3) The "function of the aggregation"-which includes at least
the factors in (1) and (2);38
(4) Whether versions of the combination of the components differ
39
significantly;

28. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
29. Id. at 559.
30. See supra note 11.
31. 394 U.S. 495 (1968).
32. Id. at 507-08.
33. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
34. Id. at 22-24.
35. See Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977); Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); American Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters, Inc., 388 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972); Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d
753 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965); United States v. Mercedes-Benz of
N.A., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1981)); Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distribs., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 973 (D. Mass. 1979); Kugler v. Aamco Automatic
Transmissions, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 872 (D. Minn. 1971), qff'd, 460 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Jerrold Elecs., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), a f'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
See also authorities cited in L. Pasahow, Tying and the Single Product Issue, 54 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 1219, 1220 (1985).

36. Moore, 550 F.2d at 1215; Mercedes-Benz of N.A., 517 F. Supp. at 1379.
37. Id.
38. Moore, 550 F.2d at 1215; Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971);
Mercedes Benz of N.A., 517 F.. Supp. at 1379.
39. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins., 338 F.2d at 282; Anderson ForeignMotors, 475 F. Supp.
at 982.
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40
(5) Practices of others in the industry;
(6) Whether the seller assigned different fees to the two
41
components;
(7) Whether the seller ever sold either of the two components
42
separately;
(8) Whether the two components practically could be sold separately;43 and
(9) Whether the two components were sold in separate
44
markets.
Despite the various criteria used by lower courts, the decisions were
fairly consistent regarding what constituted a single product and what
counted as more than one product. Thus, although several tests were
used, the results were generally in accord.
45
The decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,
clarifies how the Supreme Court thought these problems should be approached. The Court held that "the question whether one or two products are involved turns not on the functional relation between them,
but rather on the character of the demand for the two items. ' 4 6 The
Court went on to say that "it [is] clear that a tying arrangement cannot
exist unless two separate product markets have been linked"-that is,
there can be no tying arrangement unless one can identify a separate
market in which it is efficient to market each product. 47 The Court
does not clearly define what is "efficient". The Court does cite several
lower court cases supporting its position. 48 At least one commentator
has interpreted "efficiency," in light of these cases, to mean that the
sale of the two products must decrease costs apart from sales costs and
that it "probably only means that items that naturally should be sold
together, e.g., cars with tires, are a single product. ' 49 This commentator
further states that since (1) the court found that the services were
"functionally integrated" with the rest of the hospital services and
(2) the Court found there to be two distinct products, then "'functional
integration' is not a relevant consideration in determining whether two

40. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins., 388 F.2d at 282; Anderson Foreign Motors, 475 F. Supp.
at 983; Kugler, 337 F. Supp. at 875; Jerrold Elecs., 187 F. Supp. at 5559.
41. Id.

42. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins., 388 F.2d at 282; Toft-Ingalls, 340 F.2d at 763.
43. Toft-Ingalls, 340 F.2d at 763; Kugler, 337 F. Supp. at 875; Jerrold Elecs., 187 F.
Supp. at 559.

44.
1220.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Washington Gas Light, 438 F.2d at 253. See generally Pasahow, supra note 35, at
466 U.S. 2 (1984).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22, n.35.
Pasahow, supra note 35, at 1223-24.
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items are a single product. ' 50 Thus, Hyde seems to establish a fairly
strict test for finding a single product when a manufacturer sells items
together. The Hyde decision was very close, however, with four concurring Justices (O'Connor, Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist) 51 suggesting
the abolition of a per se approach to tie-ins. 52 Because the Court is
likely to change in composition fairly soon, it is conceivable that the
scrutiny of tie-in arrangements will be lessened especially in light of the
recent advocacy for the abolition of the per se approach by many
53
commentators.
III.

THE DATA GENERAL CASES5

Although the Supreme Court has found illegal tie-ins in many different circumstances, it has never found one in the computer industry.
However, there have been several cases decided by lower courts in this
area. Specifically, the Data General Cases concerned the issue of tying
arrangements in the computer industry.
In these actions, the plaintiffs (Data General's competitors) claimed
that: (1) Data General tied the licensing of its software to the sale of its
central processing units; and (2) that Data General tied the sale of its
central processing units to the sale of its memory boards. 55 The items
at issue were the central processing units ("CPUs") and peripheral
products, including memory devices and operating systems software.
CPUs process data while peripheral products translate data from
human-readable to machine readable form, and vice-veersa, in conjunction with CPU data processing activities. Memory devices receive, store,
and supply data. The CPUs, peripheral products, and the memory devices are all called "hardware" items. The operational software products are used to perform specific data processing tasks, essentially
telling the hardware what to do.- Data General manufactured and sold
all of these types of products. Data General's CPUs bore the trademark
50. Pasahow, supra note 35, at 1224.
51. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 32.
52. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 34-36.
53. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ABA ANTITRUST
L.J. 135,153 (1984); Freed, Reconsidering the Per Se Approach to Tying Agreements, 13 U.
TOL. L. REv. 571, 583-85 (1982); Meehan, and Lamer, A Proposed Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints on Competition, 16 ANTITRUST BuLL. 195, 223-25 (1981). See Slawson,
supra note 7.
54. In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ca. 1980),
529 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Ca. 1981), rev'd sub nom, Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734
F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 18
(1985).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1098.
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"NOVA."' 57 The plaintiffs also manufactured and sold CPUs that competed with NOVAs, but most of them did not manufacture software
items. 58 What they did instead was to design their hardware to emulate
the NOVAs so that Data General's software would be compatible with
their products. One company also manufactured a memory board that
59
could be used with NOVA and its emulators.
The litigation focused on Data General's marketing practices for its
software. Data General engaged in three main practices. First, Data
General licensed its software with an agreement that the purchaser
could only use the software with hardware designated by Data General.
(Data General only designated its own hardware.) Second, Data General required minimum purchases of its hardware or the payment of a
fee. Third, Data General required minimum initial purchases of its
CPUs to purchase its software. 60
The court discussed at length the question of whether a single product or several products were at issue. The court concluded that there
were separate products at issue. The court first held that "the relevant
inquiry was not whether the two items must be used together but
whether they must come from the same seller. '61 The court concluded
that other manufacturers were perfectly capable of making the necessary hardware because so many of the plaintiffs were manufacturing
emulators that could be used with Data General's software.
Data General, however, offered another reason that the two products should be viewed as a single product. It argued that its costs were
lower because the CPUs and the software were developed together.
Data General had invested the time and money necessary to develop
hardware and software that worked well together; therefore, they
should be allowed to sell the two products together. Presumably, the
competitors waited for the innovation and then jumped into the market
by copying Data General's hardware. Data General's argument was that
it needed to sell the two together to protect their innovation and that
the two things were developed as a single product and should, therefore, be allowed to be sold together. While the court appeared to hint
that this was the proper inquiry, it never fully considered this
argument.
For a complete background on tie-ins and the single product issue
in the computer industry three other cases must be considered. The
first is ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Ma57. Id.
58. Id,
59. Id,
60. d, at 1098-99.
61. Id, at 1104.
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chines Corp.6 2 In this case a tie-in was alleged when IBM sold its disk
drive unit and its head/disk assembly ("HDA") together as one unit. In
this case the court adopted the single product/"function of the aggregation" test used in Siegel v. Chicken Delight.63 Under this test, the products are considered two separate products unless there are "cost savings
apart from those reductions in sales expenses and the like normally attendant upon any tie-in" or if "the items are normally sold or used as a
unit with fixed proportions. '64 Specifically the court considered
"whether integration of the HDA into the drive unit resulted in cost
savings, and whether the HDA and the drive unit are normally sold or
used as a unit with fixed proportions. '65 The court found there were
reductions in cost and that the industry practice was to sell the integrated disks and the drives on which they operate for a single price.
66
The court, therefore, concluded that the unit was a single product.
More importantly, the court concluded that "while it would be possible
for IBM to sell the HDA for a separate price from the rest of the drive
unit, just as it would be possible to sell many of the other components
separately, IBM is not required to do so by Section 1 of the Sherman
'67
Act or Section 3 of the Clayton Act."
The second important case is A.L Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics,
Inc.68 In this case the court upheld a summary judgment finding no illegal tie-in. The arrangement called for Computer Dynamics to sell its
Basic Operating Software System (BOSS) 69 to consumers who agreed to
sign licensing agreements concerning other software. 70 The court found
that two products did exist, but that the company lacked sufficient market power and that the tying product was not unique. It held, therefore,
that no violation of the antitrust laws had occurred.
The final important case is Telex Corp. v. International Business
Machines Corp.71 Although the court found IBM guilty of monopolization and unfair competition, it concluded that no unlawful tying arrangement was present. The plaintiff claimed that "the integration of
additional memory and control functions in certain system 370 central
62. 448 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
63. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
64. Id.

65. 448 F. Supp. at 231.
66. Id. at 233.
67. Id.
68. 615 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986).
69. Software necessary to operate the computer generally and to enable the computer
to utilize applications software or to perform specific data processing tasks.
70. A.. Root, 615 F. Supp. at 730.
71. 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Oklahoma 1973), modified, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 555 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1977).
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processing units" constituted a tying arrangement. 72 The court found
that there was only a single product involved and, therefore, there was
no illegal tying arrangement. 73 Interestingly, the court held that,
"where a court is dealing with what is physically and in fact a single
product, Section 3 does not contemplate judicial dissection of that product into parts and the reconstitution of these parts into a tying agreement. '74 The court then admitted that when dealing with an industry
that is extremely technical and constantly changing (specifically the
computer industry) it is very difficult for the court to decide when integration of two parts should constitute a new single product.75 "To rule
otherwise would enmesh the courts with technical and uncertain inquiry into the technological justifiability of functional integration and
cast unfortunate doubt on the legality of product innovations in serious
detriment to the industry and without any legitimate antitrust
'76
purpose.
IV.

COMPUTERS AND THE SINGLE PRODUCT ISSUE

The decisions of the courts on the single product issue in the computer context at first seem inconsistent. Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that they reach different conclusions by making
important distinctions. Both the A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics,
Inc. decision and the ILC PeripheralsLeasing Corp. v. International
Business Machines Corp. decision are correct. This is true even though
two distinct products were found in the first case and only one product
was found in the second. The decision in Telex Corp. v. International
Business Machines Corp. also seems well reasoned and correct. The decisions in the Data General cases, however, seem wrong on this issue.
The next part of this Note will be devoted to discussing the distinction
between these cases and drawing some conclusions from those findings.
The end result will be the development of a standard that could be applied to cases to help courts resolve the single product issue in the computer context.
A distinction between the first two cases is in the uses of the products involved. In A.I. Root, the products involved were both types of
software. Although the uses of the two types of software are different,
both are products that have many easily identifiable substitutes and
both serve fairly similar functions. They are also products that are easy
to separate not only from each other, but also from the computer. No
72. Id. at 346.
73. Id. at 347.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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real claim could be made that the use of the two products resulted in a
more efficient final product than if the BOSS unit were used in conjunction with a competitor's software. The advantage of the system as a
whole was really nothing more than the advantage produced by the
BOSS unit alone.
In ILC Peripherals, on the other hand, this was not the case. In
fact the HDA when used in conjunction with the disk drive unit resulted in a "new technology [which] dramatically increase[d] the storage
capacity of disk storage devices; in addition the integration of the disks
into the drive resulted in lower manufacturing costs and lower costs per
megabyte of storage to users." 77 It is also true that the actual physical
integration of the two objects necessitated a finding that there was a
single product.
In Telex Corp., the court took the most reasonable position. The
court concedes that the computer industry is very technical and that the
products are extremely complex. "[The] technological progress in component miniaturization .

.

. made possible the integration of additional

memory and control functions and such additional integration.., made
possible cost reductions and enhanced utility. 7 8s

The court concludes

that the best way to promote the policy behind the antitrust laws is to
allow the companies to compete through innovations and to find no anticompettitive tie-in when the innovation can plausibly be considered a
new, more efficient product.
The court in the Data General cases did not seem to do as good a
job as the courts in the other cases. In this case, the court purported to
use the "function of the aggregation" test that was used in ILC Peripherals. The court first considers the question of whether the operating systems software is a distinct product from the CPU. The court
admits that, "it is clear that neither item can function without the
other", but then states that, "the relevant inquiry is not whether the
two items must be used together but whether they must come from the
same seller. '79 The court goes on to say that there is no evidence that
the items "must necessarily be manufactured by the same company."8 0
Under this standard, it appears that even something as simple as a car
would not be considered a single product. For example, when one buys
a car, the seller requires that wheels be purchased with it. Surely the
body of the car and the wheels do not necessarily have to be manufactured by the same company. An even more extreme example that demonstrates that the Data General court's interpretation surely cannot be
77.

448 F. Supp. at 233-34.

78. 367 F. Supp. at 347.
79. 490 F. Supp. at 1104.

80. Id.
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the correct single product test is a sandwich purchase. Clearly the
bread and the filler need not come from the same manufacturer, but it
is unlikely that anyone would claim that the sandwich was not a single
product.
The court was also incorrect in rejecting Data General's second argument. The second argument was that because Data General did its
research and development ("R&D") projects for both items together,
and since they were specifically designed to function together efficiently, it should be allowed to market the two items together. The
court held, however, that "the question is not whether joint R&D is
more economical than separate R&D, but whether joint R&D calls for
joint marketing."8 1 The court seems to miss the point here as well.
Data General's claim is that it has been able to create a more efficient
product by developing the two together and, therefore, it should sell the
two together. The court even recognized that "Data General establishes
beyond dispute that joint R&D yields technological benefits in the ini'8 2
tial design and gradual perfection of both CPUs and related software.
Despite the technological efficiency of selling the two items together,
the court held that the two objects constituted two new products.
The court then considers whether the CPUs and the memory devices are a single product. Again the court found that "neither a CPU
nor a memory board can function independently of the other. Yet they
are physically distinct items; each is located on a separate circuit board
which is plugged into the chassis in which the computer system is
housed."8 3 Again the court concluded that the proper inquiry was
whether both must be manufactured by the same company.8 4 The issue
of whether the two must come from the same manufacturer was not addressed. Here, the court focused on the fact that the items were distinct
and located on different parts of the computer. This again does not survive any thoughtful analysis and has been specifically rejected by at
least one court.8 5 Virtually nothing is manufactured today that is not
comprised of numerous distinct products that are not located in the
same place when put together. For example, a simple radio is comprised of hundreds of physically distinct parts that are separated by at
least some space. Surely this cannot be the factor that determines
whether something is a single product or two distinct ones.
The court also argued that the memory boards and CPUs are not
81. Id. at 1106.
82. Id. at 1105-06.
83. Id. at 1107.
84. Id
85, The goal was not to prohibit the sale of "physically separable objects, but rather
•..[to prohibit] the use of a dominant desired product to compel the purchase of a second
distinct commodity." Moore, 550 F.2d at 1214.
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normally sold or used as a unit with fixed proportions.8 6 The court
found that "the amount of 'main memory' which [Data General] sold together with its CPUs has varied over time" and that "Data General
[sold] 'add-on memory' to enable customers to expand their memory capacity. ..."87 Again the court seems to miss the point of the function of

the aggregation test. The test focuses on whether a memory board and
a CPU are normally sold together and not whether a memory board
with a specific capacity is always sold with a CPU. If the court's interpretation of the test is correct, then an illegal tie-in will occur every
time a person sold a standardized item rather than something that was
tailored to the customer's personalized specifications. To pass this part
of the test, it is only necessary that a CPU and a memory board are normally sold on a one to one ratio. Data General made the same argument about joint research and development in this context as it did
above and the court again rejected it.
Although the Data General court chose the appropriate test, they
misapplied it. The function of the aggregation test focuses on whether
selling the two components together results in real cost savings or
whether the items are normally sold or used as a unit with fixed proportions.8 8 Since the joint R&D resulted in two products that yielded
benefits when used together and resulted in cost savings, the court
should have found that only a single product was involved. The same is
true for the CPUs and the memory devices. Because selling the two together resulted in an efficient new product, there is no reason for the
court to find two distinct products.
V.

THE APPROPRIATE TEST IN THE COMPUTER CONTEXT

Underlying policy considerations should guide the choice of the applicable legal test. For the computer industry, the applicable test
should be one that reflects the fast pace of innovation, takes into account the technological complexity of the items involved, promotes
competition, and takes into account the composition industry.
Since computer technology is complex and innovation the norm, it
is important that the applicable test does not stifle innovation. This is
especially true since innovations are the major source of competition.
The test should promote' innovations that will ultimately benefit the
consumer, by producing cheaper and better products while ensuring
that anticompetitive behavior is minimized.
It is important to remember that the computer industry is booming.
There is a constant flow of new companies as well as several established
86. 490 F. Supp. at 1109.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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giants. The great number of competitors in the industry lessens the
fear of anticompetitive behavior. The similar items offered by many
competitors make it unlikely that consumers will be compelled to buy
any product from any specific manufacturer. This is only true, however, for the more generalized items and not for very new products
since only one manufacturer provides the product.
It is only in the context of unique products that tie-ins merit concern. If a manufacturer tried to tie products together that were generally available, then the consumer would simply go to that
manufacturer's competitor to buy the desired products. That is why the
ILC Peripherals and Telex Corp. cases were decided correctly. Both
cases concerned an alleged tie-in of products that were generally available in the industry but were simply being offered together in an attempt to create a better and cheaper product. This was not true in A.I.
Root where the manufacturer developed a new product and attempted
to tie it to other products.
The best approach is that used in the ILC Peripheralsand Telex
Corp. cases. Courts should focus on whether the new item claimed to
be a single product is really simply a new way to package and sell items
that are available in the industry or whether it is some clearly distinct
new product (like a new program) that is being used to tie-in something
completely different. The true test is the market. If the new product is
competitively superior, then it will prove that in the market and will
soon be offered by competitors in the same manner of packaging. If
not, then the competitors will soon offer the products separately.
The best test is very intuitive. The bottom line, however, is
whether the manufacturer can legitimately argue that the use of the
two products together results in a more efficient or cheaper final product. Moreover, the advantage of the combined products should not derive from just one of the products, but rather from the products being
used in conjunction with each other. If this is the case, then the combined products should be considered a single product and no illegal tiein arrangement should be found.
Dean Weddall

